台湾地区存在政治预算周期吗?--针对财政转移支付的考察

本文旨在研究政治预算周期在台湾地区政治制度中的表现,以及在选举过程中执政者如何应用财政政策工具以获得竞选优势。以台湾地区县市长选举为例,结合其财政转移支付制度,利用LSDV估计方法,通过实证研究发现:政治预算周期行为在台湾地区的政治制度下显著存在,具体表现在县市选举年度,台湾地区项目型补助款的支出比非选举年有显著增加;在控制经济、人口等客观因素后,由于“桩脚”等历史遗留问题,台湾地区一般县市比“直辖市”获得更多的项目型补助款。因此,转移支付制度在台湾地区已经偏离实现公共服务水平均等化的原则,台湾当局通过改变转移支付分配结构以满足选民偏好,使得经济政策沦为政治选举工具。

Is there a Political Budget Cycle in Taiwan?-An Investigation into Fiscal Transfer Payments

This paper aims to study the performance of the political budget cycle in Taiwan's democratic system and how politicians use fiscal policy tool to gain election advantage in the election process.Taking as an example the election of local county and city mayors in Taiwan and combined with its financial transfer payment system,this paper uses the LSDV estimation method to find that the periodic behavior of political budget exists significantly under the democratic system of Taiwan,specifically in the year of local election,the expenditure of project-based subsidies in Taiwan is significantly increased than that in non-election years.On the other hand,after the control of economy and population and other objective factors,the counties and cities receive more project-based subsidies than municipalities directly under the central government due to the“pile footing”and other historical problems.Therefore,the transfer payment system in Taiwan has deviated from the principle of realizing the equalization of public service level,and by changing the distribution structure of transfer payments to meet the voters'preferences,the regional governors have turned economic policy into a political election tool.