董事高管责任保险、财务弹性与企业投资效率

董事高管责任保险在财务弹性与企业投资效率之间能否较好的治理作用？文章选取2008-2015年我国Ａ股上市公司为研究样本，实证检验了董事高管责任保险、财务弹性与企业投资效率之间的关系。研究发现：财务弹性与投资不足负相关，与投资过度正相关；董事高管责任保险在二者间发挥了积极的治理作用，表现在董事高管责任保险增强了财务弹性对投资不足的抑制作用，减弱了财务弹性与过度投资之间的正相关关系。进一步研究发现，董事高管责任保险的引入有助于提升公司盈利能力和企业价值。文章的研究结论丰富了财务弹性的相关研究，也加深了当前对于董事高管责任保险公司治理作用的进一步认识，为董事高管责任保险在我国的发展和推广提供了经验证据。

Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance,Financial Flexibility and Investment Efficiency

Can the directors' and officers' liability insurance (D&O insurance) play a better role in the financial flexibility and the efficiency of investment? With China 2008-2015 A-listed companies as a sample, we test the relationship in D&O insurance, financial flexibility and corporate investment efficiency. We find that financial flexibility and low-investment are in negative correlation, but financial flexibility is positive with over-investment. D&O insurance has played a positive role in the above relationship. D&O insurance strengthens the relationship between financial flexibility and low investment, and weakens the positive relationship between financial flexibility and over investment. Further study finds that D&O insurance helps to enhance the company's profitability and value. The conclusion of this study not only enriches the theory of financial flexibility, but also deepens the further understanding of the governance of the D&O insurance. This paper provides empirical evidence for the development and promotion of directors' liability insurance in China.