Naturalism in Epistemology and the Philosophy
of Law |
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Authors: | Mark Greenberg |
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Institution: | 1.Department of Philosophy and School of Law,UCLA,Los Angeles,USA |
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Abstract: | In this paper, I challenge an influential understanding of naturalization according to which work on traditional problems
in the philosophy of law should be replaced with sociological or psychological explanations of how judges decide cases. W.V.
Quine famously proposed the ‘naturalization of epistemology’. In a prominent series of papers and a book, Brian Leiter has
raised the intriguing idea that Quine’s naturalization of epistemology is a useful model for philosophy of law. I examine
Quine’s naturalization of epistemology and Leiter’s suggested parallel and argue that the parallel does not hold up. Even
granting Leiter’s substantive assumption that the law is indeterminate, there is no philosophical confusion or overreaching
in the legal case that is parallel to the philosophical overreaching of Cartesian foundationalism in epistemology. Moreover,
if we take seriously Leiter’s analogy, the upshot is almost the opposite of what Leiter suggests. The closest parallel in
the legal case to Quine’s position would be the rejection of the philosophical positions that lead to the indeterminacy thesis. |
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