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借贷羊群行为:中小企业融资困难成因分析——基于博弈学习模型框架
引用本文:何清泉. 借贷羊群行为:中小企业融资困难成因分析——基于博弈学习模型框架[J]. 陕西行政学院学报, 2006, 20(4)
作者姓名:何清泉
作者单位:中南大学商学院,长沙,410083;湖南农业大学,理学院,长沙,410128
摘    要:关于中小企业融资难的问题,学者一般都是从信息不对称的角度来分析的,然而从另外一个角度:银行借贷羊群行为来分析,利用行为博弈学习理论来分析中小企业贷款困难的原因,通过计算机模拟银行借贷决策过程发现:当中小企业还贷率低时,银行给中小企业的贷款也低,而且由于其他银行的博弈学习行为降低了中小企业从其他银行得到贷款的机率,而当中小企业提高还贷率时,银行会增加给中小企业的贷款率。通过对银行借贷行为分析可知,中小企业要想提高贷款率,关键是提高银行博弈学习策略魅力值,提高企业的还贷率。

关 键 词:中小企业  借贷羊群行为  博弈学习

Loan Herding Behavior: Analyses of the Causes for the SMEs Financing Difficulties——Based on Game Learning Model
HE Qing-quan. Loan Herding Behavior: Analyses of the Causes for the SMEs Financing Difficulties——Based on Game Learning Model[J]. Journal of Shanxi Administration School and Shaanxi Economic Management School, 2006, 20(4)
Authors:HE Qing-quan
Abstract:About the issue of SMEs'financing difficulties,scholars generally discuss it from information asymmetry.This paper will analysis it from another angle : bank lending herding behavior,and use the behavior game theory to analysis SMEs loan difficulty.After simulating loan decision-making process,we can found that when SMEs' loan returning rate is low,the loans from the bank are also low.other banks' game learning behavior reduced SMEs' loans from other banks,and when SMEs improve owing on the loan rates,the Bank will increase lending to SMEs rate.Bank loan behavior analysis shows that SMEs raise loan rates,the key is to enhance learning strategy attraction.
Keywords:SMEs  lending herding behavior  game-learning.
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