| 两国厂商相互出口条件下出口补贴与反补贴的经济效应研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 乔小勇,何海燕,赵飞. 两国厂商相互出口条件下出口补贴与反补贴的经济效应研究[J]. 浙江省政法管理干部学院学报, 2009, 1(2): 75-81 |
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| 作者姓名： | 乔小勇 何海燕 赵飞 |
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| 作者单位： | 北京理工大学管理与经济学院,北京,100081 |
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| 基金项目： | 教育部新世纪优秀人才资助计划 |
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| 摘 要： | 随着国际贸易的迅速发展和争夺国际市场的竞争日趋激烈，出口补贴与反补贴问题越来越受到国际社会的关注。本文运用博弈论中CITPDG博弈模型，通过分析两国政府存在出口补贴时的动态博弈过程和一国政府对对方的受补贴产品征收反补贴税时的动态博弈过程，研究并总结了该博弈模型条件下出口补贴与反补贴的经济效应。
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| 关 键 词： | 出口补贴 反补贴 经济效应 CITPDG模型 互相出口 |
A Study of the Economic Effects of Export Subsidies and Countervailing under the Two-way Export |
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| QIAO Xiao-yong,HE Hai-yan,ZHAO Fei. A Study of the Economic Effects of Export Subsidies and Countervailing under the Two-way Export[J]. Journal of Zhejiang Gongshang University, 2009, 1(2): 75-81 |
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| Authors: | QIAO Xiao-yong HE Hai-yan ZHAO Fei |
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| Affiliation: | (School of Management and Economics, Beijing Institute of Technology, Beijing, 100081, China) |
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| Abstract: | With the rapid development of international trade and the gradual fierce competition of occupying international markets, export subsidies and countervailing is increasingly noticed by the international society. This paper that uses CITPDG model of Game Theory analyses the dynamic game course of existing export subsidies between two countries and one country’s government levies the countervailing tax to the subsidy commodities of the other country, then researches and concludes the economic effects of export subsidies and countervailing on a condition of the CITPDG model. |
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| Keywords: | export subsidies countervailing economic effects CITPDG model export each other |
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