Instrument choice,political reform and economic welfare

The purpose of this paper is to formally examine the effect of placing constraints, such as the line-item veto or a balanced budget amendment, on legislative behavior. There are two basic findings that emerge from the analysis. First, constraints on one type of instrument, such as spending, will in general result in more widespread use of other kinds of instruments, such as regulation. Second, it is naive to conclude that constraints on legislative behavior will promote economic efficiency and/or reduce the growth of government. The primary contribution of the paper is to suggest how changes in the political environment can affect instrument choice, economic welfare, and the size of government.This research was supported in part by a grant from the National Science Foundation Decision, Risk and Management Science Program. The author gratefully acknowledges the helpful comments of Ed Campos and Allan Meltzer. The views in this paper are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Council.