Procedural goods in a democracy: How one is treated versus what one gets |
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Authors: | Robert E. Lane |
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Affiliation: | (1) Department of Political Science (emeritus), Yale University, 3532 Yale Station, 06520 New Haven, Connecticut |
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Abstract: | There are four classes of procedural goods, each of which is an appropriate ground for answering the question: “Is this a fair procedure?” (i) It is unfair not to treat a person with dignity; the dignity goods are self-respect, personal control, and an understanding of the procedures that determine relevant outcomes. (ii) It is unfair to impose upon a person heavy (net) costs, such as overburdened cognitive capacities and high information costs, excessively painful interpersonal conflict, threats beyond those inherent in the situation, and humiliation. (iii) It is unfair to disregard (but not necessarily to violate) the person's own sense of justice, the codes of honor and practice of his own group and culture. And, of course, (iv) it is unfair to use a procedure that does not have the highest probability of achieving distributive or retributive justice. Few of the standard articles of democratic theory (e.g., liberty, equal treatment before the law, rights, and sharing of power) offer sufficient protections for the first three of these procedural goods. |
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Keywords: | justice procedure democracy rights interpersonal relations dignity understanding sense of justice |
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