Abstract: | This article scrutinises delegation and accountability in Iceland. In a healthy democracy, the representatives serve the wishes and interests of the main principal, the people. In an ailing democracy, the agents of the people primarily serve themselves. The main conclusions are as follows. First, the semi-presidential constitutional framework places the voters in a central role. They vote in two systems, electing MPs in the parliamentary system and the president by a national vote. The open primary, adopted by the main political parties, gives the voters the opportunity to participate in the selection of candidates in parliamentary elections. The central role of the voters is, however, often made difficult by the fluctuation and complexity of this dual system of representation. Second, citizen control through party organisations and party membership has all but disappeared. Instead, political parties cater to the fickle electorate and produce government policy aiming at economic stability and economic growth. Third, external constraints – the political presidency, judicial activism and Iceland's membership of the European Economic Area – all weigh in and sometimes override decisions reached by the parliamentary system of government. The final conclusion is that the Icelandic system of governance has become a rather messy and complicated political arrangement, thereby resembling the situation in other modern democracies. |