Institutionalized autocracies,policy interdependence,and labor rights

This article examines how varieties of autocracies cope with the downward international policy interdependence in labor rights. It argues that institutionalized autocracies are more resistant to this downward pressure. Workers are empowered to elicit more policy concessions in institutionalized autocracies with parties and legislatures than in noninstitutionalized autocracies in which such institutions are absent. Parties and legislatures allow workers to organize and negotiate with states regarding their rights in a regularized and peaceful manner, thereby preventing complete collusion between states and firms. Heterogeneity in autocracies' responses to downward policy pressure is thus expected. Using a conditional spatial econometric technique, this article analyzes a newly collected dataset on labor rights for the period 1994–2009 for all autocracies. The empirical results offer support to the proposed theory. The findings also show that this institutionalization only matters for labor rights laws but not for labor rights practices.