数字竞赛与双重博弈:对易地扶贫搬迁政策执行偏差的一种解释

基层政策执行会出现偏差已经成为学界的共识,但是对于此问题的分析机制并不明晰,多数研究均是从单一视角予以阐释。通过深入考察易地搬迁中“拆旧复垦”政策的具体执行过程,从自上而下与自下而上相互融合视角入手,讨论“拆旧复垦”政策如何在不同利益主体的互构下发生了转变,为何完美的指标数据与文字背后却发现政策执行陷入模糊或搁置状态。从案例解构结果来看,在发展导向的逻辑下,基层政府通过主动加码寻求搬迁规模最大化以谋求在“数字竞赛”中胜出;在压力型体制的上下博弈中,基层政府采取拼凑应对的模糊执行策略以有效应对自上而下的政绩考核;在不完全信息状态的混合博弈中,政策受众在理性计算之下与基层政府形成了“合谋的沉默”。文章的贡献在于,对基层政策执行偏差的解释没有囿于讨论科层结构的弊端,而是从政策设计本身以及不同利益主体互构的视角出发解读其内在逻辑。

Digital Competition and Two-level Game:An Explanation of the Implementation Deviation of Poverty Alleviation Relocation Policy

It has been a consensus academic circles that there will be policy implementation deviations in primary level,however,existing studies are unclear about the mechanism and limited to single perspectives.Based on examining the process of implementing“rural land reclamation”policy in poverty alleviation relocation and with a top-down and bottom-up fused perspective,we talk about how the“rural land reclamation”policy changes under the mutual construction of different interest groups and why the perfect index data and texts put into blurred or shelved policy implementation practice.According to the result of case deconstruction three reasons have been found.First,under the logic of development orientation,primary-level governments seek to maximize the relocation scale to win the“digital competition”;second,in the up-down game of pressure system,primary-level governments adopt a blurred implementation strategy of muddling through to try to effectively deal with the matter of top-down performance evaluation;third,in the mixed game of incomplete information,the policy audience forms a“collusive silence”with the primary-level government under rational calculation.The contribution of this paper is that the subject of deviation of primary-level policy implementation is not limited to discussing the disadvantages of bureaucratic structure,but from the perspective of policy design itself and the mutual construction of different subjects.