Multicandidate Equilibrium in American Elections |
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Authors: | Adams James |
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Affiliation: | 1. Department of Political Science, University of California at Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, CA, 93110, USA
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Abstract: | The United States presidential election of 1992 is anexample of a multicandidate contest involving bothDemocratic and Republican candidates. Using a spatialmodelling approach, I analyze candidate policystrategy for such elections, under the assumption thatvoters choose according to the multivariate votingmodel of behavioral research. This model representsvoters' decisions as probabilistic functions of theirpolicy preferences and political partisanship. Isuggest reasons why partisan voting motivatescandidates to locate near their party's partisans inthe policy space, and illustrate this argument withrespect to the 1992 presidential election. The resultsof computer simulations suggest that these motivationslead to multicandidate spatial equilibria, which arerobust to changes in the model's parameters.Partisanship appears to be an important source ofstability in multicandidate electoral competition. |
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