Leniency Program: A New Tool in Competition Policy to Deter Cartel Activity in Procurement Auctions |
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Authors: | Karine Brisset Lionel Thomas |
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Institution: | (1) CRESE, Université de Franche Comté, Besançon, France |
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Abstract: | This paper discusses the impact of a leniency program on incentives within cartels. The objective of this program is to encourage a cartel member to confess and implicate his co-conspirators with hard evidence about their collusive agreement. We develop a simple model of cartel behavior under a first-price sealed-bid procurement auction and we show how an effective leniency program can prevent the internal coordination of cartel members. |
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Keywords: | cartels leniency programs competition policy auctions |
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