| Abstract: | The purpose of this article is to try to discern certain general features in the origins of the demands for referenda, and why these demands succeed or fail. A distinction is drawn between (a) the demand for a referendum on a certain issue and (b) the demand to amend the constitution to allow for referenda of one form or other. (a) Nation-wide referenda are rare almost everywhere, but demands for referenda arise more frequently. The article argues there are often regularities in the way these demands arise. A request for a referendum on one specific issue can be regarded as a minority weapon. Those who have had their standpoint voted down demand a referendum. If their demand is to succeed, two conditions are important: parties which are split and strong commitment on the part of the voters. To understand why an original minority weapon can get support from the majority, two functions of the demand for referendum are central: the function as a mediation device and as a lightning rod. (b) Concerning interest in the introduction of the referendum as a more or less regular principle of government, we find that referendum enthusiasts often share a similar ideology or view of society. The most central catchword here is antiparty sentiment. |
