International Signaling and Economic Sanctions |
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Authors: | Taehee Whang Hannah June Kim |
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Affiliation: | 1. Yonsei Universitythwhang@yonsei.ac.kr;3. University of California, Irvine |
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Abstract: | Do economic sanctions serve international signaling purposes? A fully structural statistical model that employs a signaling game as a statistical model is used to investigate the existence of signaling effects of sanctions. Estimation results suggest that sanctions fail to work as a costly signal. The cheapness of sanctions prevents a target state from being able to distinguish a resolute sender state from a sender who is bluffing. When sanctions are imposed, a target rarely updates its initial evaluation of the sender state’s resolve, much less than when a military challenge is observed. |
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Keywords: | formal modeling sanctions statistical methodology |
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