Autocratic adaptation: The strategic use of transparency and the persistence of election fraud |
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Affiliation: | 1. Department of Information Management, Chienkuo Technology University, Changhua, Taiwan;2. Department of Kinesiology Health Leisure Studies, Chienkuo Technology University, Changhua, Taiwan;3. Department of Computer Science and Information Engineering, National Taiwan University of Science and Technology, Taipei, Taiwan |
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Abstract: | Why would an autocrat want, or at least make it appear to want, to reduce election fraud? In recent years, non-democratic rulers have surprisingly begun to embrace fraud-reducing technologies, like web cameras or transparent ballot boxes. The reason for this is found in the relative ease by which one type of fraud can be replaced with another. With the help of new fraud identification techniques, I argue that the installation of web cameras in polling stations changes how fraud is conducted. Web cameras do not reduce fraud, but rather make certain blatant forms of fraud, like ballot box stuffing, more costly. Autocrats then substitute for other types of fraud, such as fabricating the vote count out of view of the cameras. |
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Keywords: | Autocracy Election fraud Fraud forensics Election monitoring ICT Web cameras P16 (Political Economy) D72 (Political Processes and Rent-Seeking) D73 (Corruption) |
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