| Abstract: | For some time now, the welfare state crisis has been at the centre of the academic and political debate. But not only the analysis of crisis is omnipresent, the solution seems to be a matter of course, as well. Reasonable and united actors, who initiate the so-called “necessary” reforms are in great demand. Competitive corporatist co-operation of trade unions, employer organisations and governments, which emerged in several European countries since the late 1980s, are considered successful examples of a consensus-based crisis management. The most popular example is the Dutch Polder model that became world famous as a consensus model by the mid-1990s. However, in spite of its popularity, consensus has neither been formalized as an analytical concept nor has its creation been thoroughly scrutinized. In fact the question remains unanswered as to how and under what conditions it could happen that different and initially antagonistic actors started to regard the same solution of the stated crisis as the only conceivable option. Referring to the Dutch case and starting out from an interpretative perspective based on the Governmentality approach of Michel Foucault and the Symbolic Institutionalism of Karl-Siegbert Rehberg, the article raises the question why supply-sided strategies came to be seen as necessary and sensible and how power relations are embedded in the process of consensus creation. |
