Regulatory justice: A re-examination of the influence of class position on the punishment of white-collar crime

The issue of class bias in response to white-collar crime offenders remains unresolved because of data limitations, research design problems, and debates over the conceptualization of core factors. One problem is that previous research failed to consider the full range of legal actions that can be taken against a violator of regulatory law; it typically focuses only on criminal sanctioning when addressing the issue of bias. Recent data on formal actions taken against federal securities offenders were used to reconsider the issue of bias. This analysis, however, examined the entire range of legal actions taken against offenders—civil, administrative, and criminal. I used a logistic regression analysis to determine the sampled offenders' likelihood of receiving a punitive sanction. Both principals and “contrepreneurs” were significantly less likely to receive a punitive response than managers and other legitimate actors in the workplace. Securities professionals (other than principals) were particularly vulnerable to punitive sanctions if they were affiliated with larger firms in the industry, as opposed to smaller firms. These findings suggest that the relationship between class and the punishment of white-collar offending is more complex than suggested previously.