Counsel for the poor: An evaluation of contracting for indigent criminal defense

This paper examines the cost-effectiveness of contracting as an alternative to traditional assigned counsel and public defender systems for providing representation to poor people accused of crimes. Contracting has been endorsed by many as a means of conserving public resources while providing experienced counsel; it also has been criticized as a means of ensuring that minimal public investment, and hence minimally qualified representation, is offered to the poor. This study tests the hypothesis that contracting, particularly competitively bid contracting, is less costly than the alternatives, and offers some observations about variation in types of contract and the consequences of this variation for program costs. This study differs from most research on indigent defense in that it is based on survey data from all felony court jurisdictions in a single state, Michigan. The results suggest that competitive bidding is indeed less expensive than the alternatives, but simultaneously raise questions about the implications of this financial advantage for program quality. These findings also suggest that contracting, paradoxically, is adopted in small jurisdictions whose bars cannot support competitive bidding; as a result, these jurisdictions pay a high price for this type of program.