| Abstract: | In this paper, we explore a relatively unexamined area of sentencing—the use of alternative sanctions. While researchers have discussed the potential uses and misuses of alternative sanctions, few have focused on who receives them and why. We argue that, while alternative sanctions have the potential to be useful tools, they also open “windows of discretion” that may disadvantage certain groups. We use quantitative and qualitative data from Washington State to explore how alternative sanctions are applied in cases involving felony drug offenders. The results of quantitative analyses are largely consistent with current theories of sentencing in that court officials rely heavily on indicators of danger and blameworthiness in determining when to apply alternative sanctions. Qualitative analyses, however, suggest that decisions about alternative sanctions are complex, and that court officials’ beliefs about the fairness and efficacy of sentencing options influence the extent to which they will use available alternatives. Implications for criminal justice theory, public policy, and future research are discussed. |
