Why does the Senate “win” in conference committee?: A stability explanation |
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Authors: | Lydia D. Ortega Lawrence J. McQuillan |
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Affiliation: | 1. Department of Economics, San Jose State University, 95192, San Jose, CA, U.S.A. 2. Economic Issues, 179 East Franklin Street, P.O. Box 989, 27514, Chapel Hill, NC, U.S.A.
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Abstract: | This paper develops a bicameral stability model wherein the conference committee serves as a vehicle for mutually advantageous bicameral exchange. The goal is to maintain a single party's bicameral majority. Majority party leaders use the conference committee to attenuate the outlying positions of House standing committees that threaten the bicameral majority. Conference outcomes favor the Senate because it is more vulnerable to party turnover. Statistical results on data from the U.S. Congress, 1949 through 1991, demonstrate that when one party holds a bicameral majority, a relative increase in conference bills preserves at the margin, Senate majority-party seats at the expense of House majority-party seats. |
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