首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     

试论国有企业经营者股权激励
引用本文:李明辉. 试论国有企业经营者股权激励[J]. 河北法学, 2006, 24(6): 32-39
作者姓名:李明辉
作者单位:厦门大学,会计系,福建,厦门,361005
摘    要:对国有企业经营者实行股权激励,可以促使其利益与企业趋同,从而降低代理成本.目前,由于现有制度的问题,我国国有企业的股权激励不足与激励不当的问题并存,激励效果也不尽理想.为此,应当进一步完善相关制度,以实现对国有企业经营者的有效激励.

关 键 词:股权激励  股票期权  国有企业  代理成本
文章编号:1002-3933(2006)06-0032-08
修稿时间:2005-12-20

Stock-based Incentive of Management of State-owned Enterprise
LI Ming-hui. Stock-based Incentive of Management of State-owned Enterprise[J]. Hebei Law Science, 2006, 24(6): 32-39
Authors:LI Ming-hui
Abstract:Stock-based incentive can drive the management of state-owned enterprise to work harder and it is helpful to decrease a-gency cost.In China,however,the stock-based incentive plan is seldom used in the state-owned enterprises and the ef-fect of existent plan is not good.We should revise relevant laws and improve infrastructure institutions to promote the use of stock incentive in state-owned enterprises.
Keywords:stock-based incentive  executive stock option  state-owned enterprises  agency cost
本文献已被 CNKI 万方数据 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号