Should we trust the gatekeepers?: Auditors’ and lawyers’ liability for clients’ misconduct

Many corporate scandals of the past years (Enron, Worldcom) have made apparent the essential role of professional service providers, such as auditors, corporate lawyers, and securities analysts, in detecting and revealing corporate misconduct on the part of their clients [Coffee, J., Jr. (2006). Gatekeepers. The role of the professions in corporate governance. Oxford University Press]. Political and legal responses in the aftermath of those scandals have increased the level of regulatory intervention upon auditors and lawyers. For instance, several measures were introduced in the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, and were recommended by the European Commission.The imposition of duties of care and reporting on gatekeepers, conditional on their having observed an underlying wrongdoing or misconduct of their clients, is, however, more complicated at a theoretical level than believed by policymakers and commentators. Using framework similar to the one we have recently employed to analyze heterogeneous victims in terms of their costs of care [Ganuza, J., & Gomez, F. (2005). Caution, children crossing! Heterogeneity of victim's cost of care and the negligence rule [article 3], Review of Law and Economics, 1], we model the interaction as one in which the gatekeeper observes the state of the world affecting misconduct with a given probability, and Courts or regulators imposing duties or liabilities are unable to verify whether, in fact, misconduct had or not been observed by the lawyer or auditor. The wrongdoing by the client, however, is ex post costlessly verifiable by the Courts or regulators. Information on wrongdoing is thus verifiable but hideable. In this setting, we show that general (albeit maybe increased) standards of professional behavior by auditors or lawyers may well be sufficient as incentives. If those standards can be adequately set by Courts or regulators, in anticipation of the opportunities for strategic behavior derived from the imperfect observation and the unverifiability of actual observation, legal rules do not need to rely on more complex policies of trust or distrust towards the statements, or on the proofs, provided by the gatekeepers, concerning the actual observation of clients’ misbehavior. The implications of the model tend to imply that the distinction between voluntary violation (scienter) of duties, and mere negligence, contrary to existing Law, is not very useful in this context.