The price of non-compliance with the Kyoto Protocol: The remarkable case of Norway |
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| Authors: | Steffen Kallbekken Jon Hovi |
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| Institution: | (1) CICERO (Center for International Climate and Environmental Research – Oslo), P.O. Box 1129 Blindern, 0318 Oslo, Norway;(2) Department of Political Science, University of Oslo and CICERO, Oslo, Norway |
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| Abstract: | One of the ways to induce compliance is for an international enforcement mechanism to authorize the use of punitive consequences
against a non-compliant country. However, such consequences should not cause significant damage to other (compliant) countries. The compliance mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol fails to meet this requirement. The Enforcement Branch
of the Compliance Committee is instructed to impose punitive consequences on a non-compliant country that will have considerable
adverse welfare effects for compliant countries as well. Using a numerical model, we show that in the case of Norway, the welfare effects can actually be worse
if another country is punished than if Norway itself is punished.
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| Keywords: | Compliance enforcement General equilibrium modelling International institutions Kyoto Protocol Punitive consequences |
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