Shirking and political support in the U.S. Senate, 1964–1984 |
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Authors: | Matthew B. Wright |
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Affiliation: | 1. Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, 20530, Washington, DC
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Abstract: | Several empirical studies have suggested that legislators engage in a surprisingly large degree of on-the-job consumption, or ideological behavior. These findings cast doubt on the hypothesis that legislators can be modelled as though they seek to maximize political support. This paper attempts to determine whether commonly used proxies for ideology in fact represent behavior to which voters are averse. The results show that legislators who engage in more of this behavior lose general-election support without generally receiving compensating increases in partyprimary support. A corollary to this result is that voters punish shirking legislators significantly. |
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