Bureaucracy,altruism, and monetary policy |
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Authors: | John B. Crihfield John H. Wood |
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Affiliation: | 1. Institute of Government and Public Affairs and Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1201 W. Nevada Street, 61801, Urbana, IL 2. Department of Economics, Wake Forest University, Reynolda Station, Box 7505, 27109, Winston-Salem, NC
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Abstract: | It has recently been argued that the fiscal relationship between the Federal Reserve and the Treasury, by which the Fed keeps a portion of its earnings, imparts an inflationary bias to monetary policy because that relationship gives the Fed an incentive to increase its earnings by increasing the monetary base. This hypothesis is tested within the framework of a Federal Reserve objective function incorporating bureaucratic and social goals, and no evidence is found to support it. |
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