Bremst der Föderalismus den Leviathan? Bundesstaat und Sozialstaat im internationalen Vergleich, 1880–2005

This paper examines the impact of federal state structures on welfare state development in the six classic OECD federations since the 1880s. Starting from the widely acknowledged assumption in comparative public policy research that depicts federalism as an impediment to the expansion of the Leviathan, we demonstrate that federalism has facilitated as well as impeded social policy development. Development is contingent on several time-dependent factors, including the degree of democratization, the type of federalism, the stage of welfare state development and early distribution of social policy responsibility. Federalism also has had an impact on patterns of benefit provision, and we identify a variety of bypass strategies by which the six federations were able to overcome their built-in constitutional rigidities. These institutional changes had a lasting structural impact on the emerging patterns of social security. Overall, federalism has contributed to a status quo bias in social policy, not only because it delayed the early consolidation of national social programs but also, more recently, because it has protected the welfare state against retrenchment.