Political Action Committee Spending and Senate roll call voting |
| |
Authors: | Calcagno Peter T Jackson John D |
| |
Institution: | (1) Department of Economics, Auburn University, Auburn, AL, 36849-5242, U.S.A. |
| |
Abstract: | This paper addresses how PAC spending affects the roll call voting behavior of U.S. Senators. Using a theoretical framework which draws broadly on the voting literature, we develop models that explain Senatorial voting behavior in a pre-PAC and post-PAC world. Testing both models we find weak support for a Downs-Black view of voting participation in the first model. The second model supports the alteration of voting incentives resulting from PAC spending. We find that PACs have a positive effect on voting participation. The conjecture remains whether PACs change voting outcomes, but it is clear that they buy voting participation. |
| |
Keywords: | |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|