| Abstract: | Illness or disability is often used as an eligibility criterion by public programs that distribute money, services, privileges, and exemptions. Physicians then play a central role in the allocation process. But physicians are caught between a large pool of applicants who want some benefit, on the one hand, and an organization with limited resources to distribute, on the other hand. Three conflicts are engendered in this gatekeeping role: the tension between trusting and mistrusting information provided by the patient, the tension between erring on the false positive side and the false negative side in diagnostic decision-making, and the tension between doing everything possible for each patient and allocating limited resources among several needy clients. Several non-medical factors influence the ultimate outcome of this allocation process, which, in theory, rests on clinical decision-making: the specificity and restrictiveness of the formal definitions of illness and disability used by a program; the structure of the determination process; the overall policy of the organization on distribution of benefits; and the ability of the organization to use administrative review, direct incentives, and written standards to control the certifying behavior of physicians. |
