Capital mobility and the possibilities for international policy coordination

When capital is internationally mobile, small differences in macroeconomic policies generate massive payments imbalances that cannot be managed successfully with the policy tools used during the Bretton Woods era. Monetary and fiscal policy coordination is needed to stabilize the international economy, but is difficult to achieve. This article uses insights from the theoretical literature on international cooperation to account for characteristics of policy coordination in recent years. Examination of the strategic situation helps to explain why governments have rejected proposals for a rules-based regime (e.g., strict multilateral surveillance using quantitative indicators) yet have coordinated policy adjustments on an ad hoc basis in response to crises. A solution to the strategic problem — in which there is one mutually adverse outcome (no adjustment by any government) and a number of Pareto-optimal outcomes preferred by different governments — depends on the exercise of power. Consideration of theories about hegemony and cooperation suggests that the U.S. continues to act as a hegemon in this area, albeit of the coercive rather than benevolent sort. International theories of cooperation, however, neglect the domestic policy making practices and institutions that pose the central problems for international policy coordination.