THE POLITICS OF COURT STRUCTURE: The Addition of New Federal Judges, 1949–1978 |
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| Authors: | JON R BOND |
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| Institution: | Assistant Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M University. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Illinois at Urbana—Champaign in 1978. His research interests include public policy analysis, congressional politics, and judicial politics. |
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| Abstract: | This article analyzes the effects of party control of the Presidency and Congress, and timing during the President's term on the success of proposals to add new federal judges. Proposals for new judges are more likely to pass if the same party controls the Presidency and Congress than if different parties are in power, and proposals are more likely to pass during the first two years of the President's term than during the second two years. Party control exerts a stronger influence than timing. We also find that the variables interact to produce their influence—the only real chance of adding new judges occurs if the same party controls the Presidency and Congress, and the proposal comes early in the President's term. Under all other conditions, the probability of success is small. |
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