American culpability: the Bush Administration and the Iranian nuclear impasse

Drawing on the memoirs of Hassan Rowhani, Iran's chief nuclear negotiator (2003–2005) and newly elected president, this paper considers the impact of the Bush Administration's Iran policy on the internal politics of the Islamic Republic and the dynamics of its nuclear negotiation strategy. It argues that the administration had a detrimental effect on international nuclear negotiations with Iran and should be considered at least partially responsible for the current nuclear impasse. Identifying three key areas, it focuses on the administration's rejection of constructive engagement with the relatively moderate government of President Mohammad Khatami; the negative influence of the USA during Iran's nuclear negotiations with the EU3; and the administration's refusal to provide the Iranians with confidence-building incentives, or countenance unconditional nuclear talks, despite a policy change in Washington that was ostensibly multilateralist and gave the impression of directly engaging with the Iranians.