The provision of lighthouses services: a political economy perspective

Ronald Coase’s 1974 article on lighthouses and the Trinity House case, in particular, has triggered extensive debate on the notion of a public good, but also on the possibility of private production of public goods. The resultant literature has discussed the concept of private property and the characteristics of a public good, and offered an economic analysis of the status of lighthouses. This contribution sets out to situate the debate in the context of an economic policy for which the lighthouse is an asset subject to political rent seeking. Thus, it highlights the fact that the characteristics of rivalry and exclusion, which define the public good, are in fact influenced by governments, which decide the nature of the services produced by lighthouses. The weight of the institutional setting, together with political competition for the control of lighthouses, calls for interpretation relating to rent seeking. In this respect, the lighthouse, prior to being a capital asset, has already emerged as a political object that is a source of revenue for certain individuals.