Covert action and congressional oversight: A deontology |
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Authors: | Charles G. Cogan |
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Affiliation: | Harvard University , John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, Center for International Affairs , Cambridge, MA, 02138 |
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Abstract: | Abstract Covert action, i.e. covert operations whose main object is not the collection of intelligence, is a child of the Cold War. Almost haphazardly, it came to be conducted by the CIA, the nation's principal foreign intelligence service. Covert action, in its early years surrounded by secrecy, did not become legally subjected to congressional oversight until the Hughes‐Ryan Amendment, 14 years after the Bay of Pigs. In this legislation, and in the follow‐on Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980, covert action came under a separate oversight process than the collection of intelligence. In the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1991, in which covert action for the first time was officially admitted by name as an activity of the U.S. Government, certain loopholes were addressed which had been revealed by Iran‐Contra (the issues of timely notification of Congress, involvement of third parties, and involvement of other U.S. Government agencies). Issues still remain, including the conduct of liaison with foreign intelligence services, which is outside of the covert action oversight process—although at times such liaisons are made as much for the purpose of establishing influence as for collecting intelligence. |
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Keywords: | Covert action oversight intelligence |
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