The effect of misperception on strategic behavior in legislative settings: Social psychology meets rational choice |
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Authors: | Allan W. Lerner Barry S. Rundquist Mike Cline |
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Affiliation: | (1) Department of Political Science, University of Illinois at Chicago, USA |
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Abstract: | This paper is about the conditions under which simple social psychological processes can affect collective decisions. In rational choice theory, social psychological effects are said to cancel out, be randomized, or be corrected by communication. Yet as Janis and Mann (1977) argued, there are generally recurring conditions in which such factors influence individual decisions. The question is, Under what conditions can we expect these factors to affect collective decisions? This paper suggests a general approach to identifying the effects of strategic misperception, illustrates it with an example of a social psychological process that affects player perceptions, and describes the preference distributions in which this simple process would change majority voting outcomes. The general conclusion is that strategic misperception may affect majority decisions under so many distributions of preferences that decisions cannot be predicted from knowledge of actors' preferences alone. |
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