Policy-making and Political Supervision in Shanghai's Financial Industry

This study deals with the political economy of local financial industries in China. It focuses on the changing patterns of political interference and the key role of Communist Party bodies in shaping business incentives. The centralization measures in the financial sector that were implemented under the Zhu Rongji government in 1998 and 1999 turned out to be not very effective in supervising local financial institutions. From 2000 to 2003, a trend towards a reaffirmation of local control in financial business emerged. Local governments began to set up new financial work bodies with comprehensive functions and extensively used local banks as their ‘moneybag’ again. Reducing the risks involved in the current politicized management of local financial business will be inseparable from political, legal and regulatory changes: curbing the Communist Party's role in cadre appointments, strengthening legal corporate governance structures and clarifying the division of labor among national and local supervisory bodies.