| Abstract: | The Liberal Democratic Party continuously held an absolute majority in the Japanese Lower House, under the Gojyûgonen taisei (System of 1955), from its founding in 1955 until its break-up and temporary fall from power in 1993. Until 1989, it also had a majority in the Upper House. Unlike the Italian DC, the Japanese dominant party never formally entered into coalition with another party — except for a single minor occurrence1. Despite this continuity at one level, 15 different prime ministers presided over 48 Japanese cabinets formed between 1955 and 1993, whose average duration was 9.4 months. The re-allotment of all cabinet portfolios and party posts took place every year with a metronomic regularity and these realignments were fully-fledged exercises in coalition-building even though only one party was involved. This cabinet instability has provided evidence for the view that the LDP surrendered both policy- and decision-making power to the bureaucracy. But, since the LDP clung to the practice of yearly cabinet reshuffles rather than remedying this by simply changing the party constitution, the consequent weakening of the executive power cannot have been seen as having imposed a heavy cost. And, since the LDP held onto power for such a long time, it is obvious that this cost was successfully managed. The purpose of this paper is to treat the one-party Gojyûgonen taisei system as an important case study for coalition theory, relaxing the assumption of the LDP as an unitary actor and considering the party as a political system in its own right. |
