Should lawyers listen to philosophers about legal ethics?

In the recent spate of philosophers' writing on legal ethics, most contend that lawyers' professional role exposes them to great risk of moral wrongdoing; and some even conclude that the role's demands inevitably corrupt lawyers' characters. In assessing their arguments, I take up three questions: (1) whether philosophers' training and experience give them authority to scold lawyers; (2) whether anything substantive has emerged in the scolding that lawyers are morally bound to take to heart; and (3) whether lawyers ought to defer to philosophers' claims about moral principle. I return a negative answer to each.Excerpts from a earlier draft have appeared in A. Kaufman, Problems in Professional Responsibility, (Boston: Little, Brown, 3rd ed. 1989) pp. 758–65. Thanks are owed to Steve Munzer and to Andy Kaufman for their encouragement and advice.