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The structure of the Banks set |
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| Authors: | Nicholas R. Miller Bernard Grofman Scott L. Feld |
| Affiliation: | 1. Department of Political Science, University of Maryland, 21228, Baltimore County, Catonsville, MD 2. School of Social Science, University of California, 92717, Irvine, CA 3. Department of Sociology, State University of New York, 11790, Stony Brook, NY |
| Abstract: | We consider a new solution set for majority voting tournaments recently proposed by Banks (1985), and we examine its internal structure. In particular, we demonstrate that, in the absence of a Condorcet winner, there is always a cycle including precisely the points in the Banks set. We introduce the concept of “external stability” in order to facilitate analysis. |
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