Voting competitions with interested politicians: Platforms do not converge to the preferences of the median voter |
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Authors: | Ingemar Hansson Charles Stuart |
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Affiliation: | 1. University of Lund, Sweden 2. Department of Economics, University of California at Santa Barbara, 93106, Santa Barbara, CA
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Abstract: | We examine equilibrium voting strategies for elections with interested politicians facing uncertainty about voter pReferences. If politicians' utilities are defined over the set of strategies that voters select (instead of being dependent only on the probability of winning an election), equilibrium strategies will diverge (instead of converging to the median voter's pReferences) as long as politicians have different pReferences. We present conditions (i) for political compromise, and (ii) for politicians with different utility functions to merge into parties with complete strategic agreement. |
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