State Building, Interstate and Intrastate Rivalry: A Study of Post-Colonial Developing Country Extractive Efforts, 1975–2000

This paper seeks to understand the relationship between state building, interstate and intrastate rivalry. Previous studies of state building have focused primarily on the European experience, with selective application to cases in the developing world. Prior studies of interstate rivalry have focused primarily on their effects on interstate relations. This paper seeks to expand the domain of both literatures. First, the paper investigates the applicability of the predatory theory of the state, derived from the European experience, in the context of the postcolonial developing world. Second, the paper expands interstate rivalry research to an examination of the effects of both interstate and intrastate rivals on domestic politics. In particular, the literature derived from the European experience considers decisions about fiscal policy as central to the process of state building and survival. Therefore, this paper examines the effects of internal and external rivals on extractive capacity in the context of state development in sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, and Asia from 1975 to 2000. A series of pooled, cross-sectional time-series analyses suggest that external and internal rivals increase the extractive capacity of the state in a manner similar to the experience of early modern Europe.