Is more institutional coup-proofing better or worse for regime protection? Evidence from the Philippines, 1986–1987

Is more institutional coup-proofing (ICP) better or worse for leaders’ chances of political survival? Are coups less or more likely to occur and succeed as a state’s military structure becomes increasingly divided into rival branches, organizations, and factions? The article evaluates two competing perspectives on the effectiveness of counterbalancing as a regime protection measure. Seeing strength in numbers and the prospects for divide-and-conquer tactics, most scholars take a more-is-better view, suggesting that higher levels of ICP should increase the effectiveness of counterbalancing. Some scholars, however, advance a more-is-worse perspective, suggesting that collective action problems confronting larger numbers of military organizations decrease the effectiveness of counterbalancing. Through a qualitative analysis of eight coup events in the Philippines during 1986–1987, strong evidence is found in support of the causal mechanisms and predicted outcomes for the more-is-better view.