| 治理河流污染的制度激励悖论分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 丁社教. 治理河流污染的制度激励悖论分析[J]. 中国行政管理, 2008, 0(2) |
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| 作者姓名： | 丁社教 |
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| 作者单位： | 西北工业大学人文与经法学院 副教授，西安710072 |
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| 摘 要： | 为了治理日益加剧的河流污染,从中央到地方都相应出台了各种激励措施,但是这些措施并未起到显著效果,却形成了制度激励悖论。排污企业与地方政府在经历了新政策出台初的短暂扰动后,恢复原有均衡。要打破这一均衡,必须改变博弈各方的收益结构、可选策略集以及信息结构等,才有望建立符合科学发展观的最优均衡。
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| 关 键 词： | 河流污染 治理 制度激励悖论 博弈 |
An Allais's Paradox Analysis of System Stimulation on Governance of Stream Pollution |
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| Ding Shejiao Ding She jiao is a Associate Professor at School of Humanities Economics and Law,Northwestern Polytechnical University,the academic research focuses on socialistic democracy and legal system building,Xi'an. An Allais's Paradox Analysis of System Stimulation on Governance of Stream Pollution[J]. Chinese Public Administration, 2008, 0(2) |
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| Authors: | Ding Shejiao Ding She jiao is a Associate Professor at School of Humanities Economics Law Northwestern Polytechnical University the academic research focuses on socialistic democracy legal system building Xi'an |
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| Affiliation: | Ding Shejiao Ding She jiao is a Associate Professor at School of Humanities Economics and Law,Northwestern Polytechnical University,the academic research focuses on socialistic democracy and legal system building,Xi'an 710072 |
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| Abstract: | To govern the aggravating stream pollution,both central and local governments disclosed various stimulating measures,which became the allais's Paradox of System Stimulation instead of introducing positive effects.Polluting the enterprise and the local government restore their original balance after brief dynamics with new policies in the initial stages.To break this balance,we must change the beneficial structures of all parties in the game,optional tactics collection and information structure and so on.Only in this way can we reach the optimum balance inaccordance with the scientific outlook on development. |
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| Keywords: | stream pollution governance allais's paradox of system stimulation games |
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