| Abstract: | Intergovernmental developments for more than twenty-five yearshave produced a nation-centered federalism—strongly sofrom 1964 to 1978, somewhat less so from 1969–1988, anda little more so during the past two years. The reasons forthis fundamental systemic transformation include: (1) the demiseof the earlier, 150-year old, confederative party system andthe rise of a new political system with weak federative parties,but other more powerful political actors; (2) an operationaland local representational renaissance of the states, but alsoa concomitant decline of state and local political influencein Washington; (3) a steadily centralizing Supreme Court, withonly a few pro-state decisions until 1989; and (4) a rapid risein national preemptions and of a "new social regulation" thatwas aimed at state and local governments as much as at the privatesector, even as the states were used to implement them. Theonly real constraint on national activism since 1982 has beenbudget-driven federalism, not planned reform efforts. The currentsystem then requires political, representational, judicial,and constitutional reforms if the centralizing, cooptive, andpermissive features of contemporary federalism are to be corrected. |
