| 我国劳资冲突的演化过程与解决条件研究——基于利益博弈的视角 |
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| 引用本文： | 王飞鹏. 我国劳资冲突的演化过程与解决条件研究——基于利益博弈的视角[J]. 中国劳动关系学院学报, 2012, 26(2): 21-24 |
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| 作者姓名： | 王飞鹏 |
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| 作者单位： | 首都经济贸易大学劳动经济学院,北京,100070 |
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| 基金项目： | 教育部人文社科规划项目，山东省住房和城乡建设厅 |
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| 摘 要： | 劳资冲突若是在企业内部不能有效化解,那么有可能会通过劳动者参与集体行动而外部显现化,从而形成劳资冲突的演化过程.在劳资冲突演化过程中,劳资双方的利益博弈机制影响着劳资双方的行动决策,并最终制约劳资冲突解决的进程.
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| 关 键 词： | 劳资冲突 演化 利益博弈 非利己倾向 |
The Evolution and Settlement Conditions of Labor Conflict in China |
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| Wang Feipeng. The Evolution and Settlement Conditions of Labor Conflict in China[J]. Journal of China Institute of Industrial Relations, 2012, 26(2): 21-24 |
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| Authors: | Wang Feipeng |
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| Affiliation: | Wang Feipeng(Capital University of Economics and Business,Beijing,100070,China) |
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| Abstract: | If labor conflicts can not be defused in enterprises,they could become labor collective actions.In the process of labor conflict evolution,the interest game mechanism influence on the action decisions of both side and on the resolving process. |
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| Keywords: | labor conflict evolution interest game un-self-interest orientation |
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