Veto players, electoral incentives and international commitments: The impact of domestic institutions on intergovernmental organization membership

Abstract.  The conventional literature on international cooperation in general, and intergovernmental organization membership in particular, depicts a regular, positive relationship between wealthy capitalist democracies and participation in international institutions. While empirical evidence supports this assertion, it says little about the mechanisms, and the accompanying variation among them, by which states enter into international institutions. This study distinguishes industrialized democracies along two dimensions: the nature of their constitutional structures and the organization of their electoral politics. Variations in these features produce variations in the institutional constraints and electoral incentives that matter in determining state participation in international organizations. Results of a pooled cross-sectional time series analysis of 23 democracies in 1981 and 1992 indicate that the structure of governing institutions and the nature of electoral systems account for much of the variation in intergovernmental organization membership. This study concludes that domestic institutions matter in determining international cooperation through international organizations – a novel insight overlooked by most international relations theories.