FEDERAL LEGISLATION AND INTEREST FORMATION: THE CASE OF IMPUTED INTEREST GROUPS |
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| Authors: | Guy C. Colarulli Bruce F. Berg |
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| Affiliation: | GUY C. COLARULLI is an Assistant Professor of Politics and Government at the University of Hartford. He received his Ph.D. in political science at the American University. His publications include an article in Polity that develops a typology of interest groups in the housing policy arena. He spent 1981–1982 as an APSA Congressional Fellow working for the Senate Subcommittee on Housing and Urban Affairs.;BRUCE F. BERG is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Fordham University. He is currently Director of Fordham's Graduate Public Affairs Program. He received his Ph.D. from the American University. He has published several articles on health policy and program evaluat ion. |
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| Abstract: | This paper examines an impact of federal legislation on the formation of political interests; it identifies and defines a phenomenon we have labeled imputed interest groups . The interest groups can be seen when federal legislation makes benefit packages that serve as incentives to interest formation and ties interest groups to the maintenance of these benefit packages. Identification of imputed interest groups necessitates a re-examination of subgovernments, service deliverer-recipient relationships, and policymaking in a federal system. |
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