Voters and their representatives: electoral institutions and delegation in parliamentary democracies

Abstract. Of all the links in the democratic delegation chain, the first link (from voters to legislators) may be fraught with the greatest potential for agency losses. Voters — the ultimate principals – may lack the information and resources to select the best legislators and subsequently ensure that they do the public's bidding. This paper uses some of the insights of the principal–agent approach to examine the Voter–MP relationship by focusing primarily on two sets of organisational and institutional rules: methods of candidate selection and electoral laws. Since the emphasis is on direct links between voters and legislators (rather than on the intermediary role of parties), we examine electoral laws in terms of the incentives they provide for candidates to seek a personal vote. Since agency losses are most likely when the MPs' careers do not directly depend on voters, electoral systems are arranged on a continuum from party–centred systems (little or no incentive to seek personal votes), to intermediate systems (limited effectiveness of personal voting) to candidate–centred systems (where personal voting is most effective). One of the arguments is that a trade–off often exists between the directness of the link between voter and agent and the choice of agents that is crucial to voters' abilities to sanction agents. If it is thought desirable that voters have the ability to directly sanction representatives, then an institutional design involving effective preferential voting in districts of moderate magnitude should be optimal.