| 博弈论视角下腐败犯罪的法律控制 |
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| 引用本文： | 任慧,包伟. 博弈论视角下腐败犯罪的法律控制[J]. 黑龙江省政法管理干部学院学报, 2009, 0(2) |
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| 作者姓名： | 任慧 包伟 |
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| 作者单位： | 苏州大学,法学院,江苏,苏州,215006 |
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| 摘 要： | 解决腐败问题,法律控制的切入点一直局限于两处:加重对腐败者的刑罚和将尽可能多的腐败行为犯罪化。借助博弈论的分析方法,将立法者、执法者视为相互独立的主体,与腐败者进行"三人博弈",以博弈对局的确立来分析法律的运行机理和效力机制,分析法律对腐败行为的影响途径和程度,可以认为:法律对腐败犯罪控制力低的主要原因不在于刑罚轻,而在于陷入了激励悖论。
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| 关 键 词： | 法律 博弈分析 实施机制 激励悖论 |
Penalty on Corruption Crimes in the Perspective of Game Theory |
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| REN Hui,BAO Wei. Penalty on Corruption Crimes in the Perspective of Game Theory[J]. Journal of Heilongjiang Administrative Cadre Institute of Politics and Law, 2009, 0(2) |
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| Authors: | REN Hui BAO Wei |
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| Affiliation: | REN Hui; BAO Wei; |
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| Abstract: | Solving the problem of corruption,the law is indispensable.However,the legal control of the entry point has been limited to two: to increase the penalties for corruption,as well criminalize as many as possible of the malversation.In this paper,legislators and law enforcers are regarded as being independent of each other originally,and constitute "three-person game" together with corruptionists as viewed from Game Theory.Then the enforcement principle and effectiveness mechanism of laws are analyzed by estab... |
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| Keywords: | law analysis of game effectiveness mechanism inspiriting paradox |
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