Der Zugang von Interessengruppen zu den Organen der Europäischen Union: eine organisationstheoretische Analyse

The access of interest groups to EU institutions is often analyzed because biased access might lead to biased policies. Contrary to analyses that pay attention only to the exchange of expertise in EU politics for an explanation of interest group access, the article highlights the role of organisational, sectoral, and systemic factors. These shape the contact patterns of interest groups with EU institutions. It draws on original data based on a survey of 800 German, British, French and EU business associations. Ordinal regressions identify as general features of EU political processes not only the exchange of expertise, but also the pronounced division of labor among EU associations and national associations as well as the privileged access of resourceful interest groups. They also present evidence that the Council, the European Commission, and the European Parliament have quite different criteria for consulting interest groups.