Elections and government spending |
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Authors: | James L. Payne |
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Affiliation: | 1. Lytton Research and Analysis, 335 Lavina Avenue, 83864, Sandpoint, ID
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Abstract: | It is widely believed that electoral pressures cause legislators to favor government spending programs. This electoral theory of spending is shown to encompass two core hypotheses: (1) the electoral consequences hypothesis, which states that support for spending programs improves the representative's electoral showing; and (2) the legislator insecurity hypothesis, which states that greater electoral insecurity leads representatives to be more in favor of spending programs. A test of these ideas using spending scores for U.S. representatives in 1986 finds that neither hypothesis is supported by the data. |
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